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Abstract
A Supreme Court decision legalizing sports betting in the US led states to legalize sports
betting in order to generate new tax revenues from wagering on sports events. Most states
already permit other forms of gambling and receive tax revenues from these sources. The
literature analyzing consumer substitution in gambling spending contains some evidence on the
impact of expansions in many types of gambling, but no evidence on the impact of expanded
sports betting. This paper exploits the legalization of sports betting and timing of sports
book openings in West Virginia to analyze the impact of expanded sports betting on other
casino gambling. Evidence using Instrumental Variables and difference-in-differences shows
that increased consumer spending on sports betting caused a significant decline in spending on
video lottery terminals (VLTs) in casinos, both of which generate tax revenues. Fiscal impacts
include $2.6 million in new tax revenue from sports betting and a $45.4 million decrease in VLT
tax revenues caused by expanded sports betting.
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Executive Summary
West Virginia legalized sports betting in early 2018. The first sports book in the state opened
in the Hollywood Casino in Charles Town at the end of August 2018. Three additional sports
books opened in the state in the following months. The legislation legalizing sports betting clearly
anticipated that wagering in sports books would generate new tax revenues. From the opening of
the first sports book through the first week of March 2020, when all state casinos were shut down
because of health concerns stemming from the novel coronavirus, the state received $2.6 million in
tax revenue from sports betting, excluding the Greenbrier Resort.
West Virginia already offered consumers a wide variety of legal gambling opportunities prior to
the legalization of sports betting, including horse race betting, available since 1933, greyhound bet-
ting, lotteries, available since 1984, VLTs, available in casinos since 1994, and table-game gambling
in casinos, available since 2008. In addition, the state legalized VLT gambling at stand-alone “hot
spots” in 2001. The state also received substantial tax revenues from these other forms of gambling.
Race track casinos pay annual licensing fees to operate VLTs and table games. The state taxes net
VLT revenue at 53.5% and adjusted gross table game revenue at 35%. Total revenue generated by
VLTs in race track casinos for fiscal year 2018 (July 2017-June 2018) amounted to $5.6 billion. The
$484 million in Net VLT Revenue from this VLT play, taxed at 53.5%, amounts to $259 million
in tax revenue. Table games in casinos and VLTs outside casinos also generate substantial tax
revenues for the state.
Adding a new form of gambling to an existing portfolio of other types of gambling generates
many impacts. Consumer gambling options expand, especially inside casinos where newly opened
sports books compete for gambler’s time and spending. Adding a sports book to a casino could
attract new customers, especially if sports betting appeals to people in ways that VLT play or table
games do not. If betting on sports represents new spending that would not have occurred absent
the sports book, then gambling tax revenues would clearly increase. This also occurs if the opening
of a sports book leads existing customers to wager more than they did before the sports book
opened. However, opening a new sports book in a casino could lead existing customers to spend
less on other forms of gambling like VLTs, and spend more betting on sports. The overall impact
on gambling revenues, and on tax revenues, depends on the nature of the relationship between
sports betting, wagering on table games, and wagering on VLTs.
Little can be learned about this complex relationship by simple comparisons of economic out-
comes in casinos. For example, a comparison of average weekly VLT revenues before and after the
opening of a sports book in a casino cannot reveal much about the causal impact of legal sports
betting on VLT wagering. Casino customer spending on VLTs reflects many factors unobservable
to an analyst interested in understanding the impact of a new sports book on VLT wagering, in-
cluding the consumer’s economic condition, the relative attractiveness of sports betting and VLT
gambling in the mind of the consumer, the perceived attractiveness and expected return to the
alternative wagers, and many other unobservable factors. These unobservable factors also affect
consumer decisions to wager on sports, and how much to spend on sports betting, confounding the
underlying relationship in ways that simple statistical comparisons cannot overcome.
This paper investigates the effect of spending on sports betting on spending on VLT and table
games in West Virginia Casinos after the opening of sports books using a common method in
economics, the instrumental variables (IV) approach. IV exploits variation in some other variable
that explains variation in sports betting, in this case the number of sporting events available to bet
on each week, that is also unrelated to unobservable factors affecting spending on VLTs and table
games. Under certain conditions, IV methods generate results reflecting the causal relationship
between economic variables. The results show that spending on sports betting had no effect on
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spending at table games, but that each dollar spent betting on sports reduced in-casino spending
on VLTs by about $4. This represents a casino customer who spent her evening and $40 on VLTs
before the sports book opened and changed her behavior to instead spent about $20 on VLTs and
the rest of her evening in the sports book after making a $5 wager.
In addition, results show that, holding many factors affecting VLT spending constant, spending
on VLTs increased when the Mardi Gras and Wheeling Island sports books unexpectedly shut
down from March 2019 to February 2020 because of a licensing dispute. This shut down should
be unrelated to unobservable factors affecting spending on VLTs. Again, this result comes from
a regression model that statistically controls for many factors affecting VLT spending. A simple
comparison of average VLT spending during this shutdown to before and after the shutdown would
not adequately control for other confounding factors.
The implications of these results for gambling taxes are clear, and magnified by existing state
tax policy which taxes net VLT revenue at 53.5% and net sports betting revenue at 10%. The $239.5
million sports book handle at race track casinos from September 2018 to March 2020 generated
$2.6 million in tax revenue. Absent legal sports betting, the IV results predict that VLT revenues
would have been $948 million higher, an increase of about 11%, if no sports betting opportunities
existed. VLT tax revenues would have been $45.4 million higher. Although legalized sports betting
generated $2.6 million in tax revenue, increased spending in sports books reduced spending on
VLTs in casinos, leading to a $42.8 million decrease in overall gambling tax revenues below what
would have been collected if sports betting were not legalized.
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Introduction
On 14 May 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) declared the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA) unconstitutional. PASPA made sports betting
legal in Nevada and illegal in almost every other state. Following this SCOTUS decision, the power
to legalize and regulate sports betting devolved to states.
A number of states legalized sports betting soon after the decision. Some, like West Virginia,
passed laws legalizing sports betting before the SCOTUS decision. 17 states (Delaware, New Jersey,
Mississippi, West Virginia, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Arkansas,
New York, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Colorado, North Carolina, and Tennessee) legalized
sports betting as of early 2020. Many others are currently considering legalization.
States legalize sports betting in order to generate new tax revenues, generally in the form of
license fees for the operation of sports books and taxes on net revenues earned from bookmaking.
However, most states that legalize sports betting already receive substantial tax revenues from
other forms of gambling, like lotteries, video lottery terminals (VLTs), and casino table gaming.
Understanding the fiscal consequences of legalizing sports betting requires understanding the rela-
tionship between consumer spending on sports betting and spending on other types of gambling
in casinos. Limited evidence exists on the impact of legalizing or expanding sports betting on
consumer spending on other forms of gambling, referred to as cannibalization in the literature.
A recent survey article summarizing evidence on gambling market cannibalization found no
existing research on the impact of legalizing or expanding sports betting on any other type of
gambling (Marionneau and Nikkinen, 2017). Only one paper, Room et al. (1999), found evidence
that the opening of a new casino reduced the frequency of consumer sports betting, based on a
single casino opening in Canada and none analyzed the impact of opening sports books on other
casino revenues. Three papers (Miers, 1996; Forrest, 1999; Forrest and Pe´rez, 2011) analyzed the
impact of expansion of lotteries on sports betting in the form of football pools in the UK and Spain.
The evidence in these papers suggests that the introduction of lotteries substantially significantly
cannibalized football pool betting.
Another line of research exploits cross-state changes in the availability of gambling to assess the
extent to which spending on one type of gambling cannibalizes other types of gambling. Papers
in this area include Walker and Jackson (2008), Farrell and Forrest (2008), Paton and Williams
(2013), and Cummings et al. (2017). Most of these studies employ relatively aggregated data at
the annual state or county level. These studies generally report strong evidence of cross-state or
region cannibalization in gambling markets.
This paper addresses the lack of evidence on the effect of expanding sports betting on casino
revenues from table games and VLTs using data from West Virginia. This paper is the first to
develop causal evidence that consumer wagering on sports causes decreases in consumer wagering
on VLTs. The paper contributes to the literature on cannibalization in gambling markets by
exploiting unusual sources of exogenous variation in the availability of gambling at the individual
casino level. It also contributes to the literature analyzing gambling tax revenues in the broader
context of state tax revenues (Nichols et al., 2015; Walker and Jackson, 2011) by focusing on changes
in two different streams of gambling tax revenues not previously analyzed in this literature.
West Virginia casinos opened five new sports books between September and December 2018. In
the prior fiscal year (July 2017 through June 2018), the state generated $38 million in tax revenues
from table games and $253 million in tax revenues from VLTs located in casinos. Results from an
instrumental variables estimation approach that also exploits the staggered opening of sports books
and the shut down of two sports books for nearly a year in a difference-in-differences framework
indicate that each additional dollar spent on sports betting in casinos in West Virginia reduced
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revenues from VLTs in casinos by $3.96, representing an elasticity of VLT revenues with respect to
changes in sports betting handle of 0.18 at the mean of the distributions. Sports betting had no
effect on revenues from table gaming in casinos.
In terms of forgone tax revenues, West Virginia taxes net VLT revenues at 53.5% and net sports
book revenues at 10%. The reduction in VLT revenues caused by the legalization of sports betting
resulted in $45.4 million dollars in forgone VLT tax revenues at the four race track casinos from
September 2018 until March 2020 when all West Virginia casinos closed due to health concerns
from the novel coronavirus. In return, legalized sports betting in West Virginia generated $2.6
million in new tax revenues over this period.
West Virginia Gambling in Context
The West Virginia Lottery Commission (WVLC) regulates all gambling in the state. Five licensed
casinos with table games and VLTs operate in West Virginia; four of the five also operate either
horse or greyhound race tracks. The fifth casino, at the Greenbrier Hotel, operates under separate
gambling regulations as an historic resort hotel. Horse race betting has been legal in the state since
1933, when the Charles Town race track opened. Lottery ticket sales began in 1984. Video lottery
terminal (VLT) gambling began in 1994 at race tracks only. Table game-based gambling began at
all five in 2008.
In 2001 the Limited Video Lottery Act changed the nature of VLT gambling in the state,
eliminating all existing machines and requiring installation of new VLTs, capping the number of
VLTs at 9,000, and permitting VLTs in stand-alone locations outside race tracks. Substantial video
lottery gambling currently exists in the state at both stand-alone state-wide establishments that
also sell alcohol, and at all casinos.
Figure 1 shows the locations of the five casinos in West Virginia. Mountaineer Casino and
Wheeling Island Casino, located in the northern panhandle, lie in close proximity to both Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania (60 miles, about one hour driving time) and Columbus, Ohio (127 miles, about
two hours driving time). Hollywood Casino, located in the eastern panhandle, lies in the Washing-
ton DC SMSA, just 63 miles from downtown DC and 75 miles from Baltimore. Mardi Gras Casino,
located in Nitro, in western Kanawha county, lies between two of the largest cities in the state,
Charleston and Huntington, and can be reached by car from Cincinnati, Ohio in just over 3 hours.
The Greenbrier, located in White Sulphur Springs in the south east of the state, is a historic resort
and tourist destination not located in close proximity to any major urban centers.
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the five casinos in West Virginia. The four located at
race tracks operate under the same set of regulations. The casino at the Greenbrier operates under
a different set of regulations and taxes. One company, Delaware North, owns and operates the two
casinos connected to dog tracks in Nitro (Mardi Gras) and Wheeling. A large gaming corporation,
Penn National, owns and operates the Hollywood casino. The current governor of West Virginia,
Jim Justice, owns and operates the Greenbrier Resort and Casino. With the exception of the
Greenbrier, all casinos in the state operate large numbers of VLTs.
West Virginia taxes gambling in several ways. The four race track casinos pay an annual
$500,000 licensing fee to operate VLTs and table games. The Greenbrier casino pays an annual
license fee based on average table game revenues at the other four casinos. The state taxes net
VLT revenue at 53.5% and adjusted gross table game revenue at 35%. Total revenue from VLTs in
race track casinos for fiscal year (FY) 2018 (July 2017-June 2018) amounted to $5.6 billion; VLT
gambling at the Greenbrier Casino generated only $4.8 million. Taxable VLT receipts amounted to
$485 million with just $1.4 million generated at the Greenbrier. Casino VLT tax revenues totaled
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Figure 1: Casinos in West Virginia
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$257 million in FY 2018. These revenues go to a variety of sources including track purse funds,
pensions for track employees, horse and dog development funds, and various county and municipal
governments. Total table game revenue in fiscal year 2018 amounted to $105 million including $5
million at the Greenbrier. This generated just over $35 million in tax revenues in FY 2018.
Table 1: West Virginia Casino Characteristics
Casino Location Opened Type Licensee VLTs
Hollywood Charles Town - eastern WV 1933 Horse Track Penn National 2,700
Mountaineer New Cumberland - northern WV 1951 Horse Track Eldorado Resorts 1,459
Wheeling Island Wheeling - northern WV 1866 Dog Track Delaware North 1,237
Mardi Gras Nitro - western WV 1985 Dog Track Delaware North 857
Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs - southeastern WV 1913 Historic Resort Justice Family 248
The legalization of sports betting adds another gambling option to the state’s existing portfolio
of legal forms of gambling. Adding an additional form of gambling to a market with other existing
gambling opportunities can generate many changes. Legalized sports betting could attract new
consumers to casinos, or to create accounts for mobile betting, from the ranks of non-participants
with no interest in wagering at VLTs, table games, or race tracks, increasing gambling spending and
tax revenues. Alternatively, legalized sports betting could induce existing gamblers to substitute
some or all of their gambling spending away from existing forms of gambling, called cannibalization
in the existing literature.
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A recent survey of the gambling literature (Marionneau and Nikkinen, 2017) reports exten-
sive evidence of substantial cannibalization among other types of gambling. This survey contains
substantial evidence of cannibalization of existing casino spending by many other types of gam-
bling including lotteries, VLTs, and pari-mutuel horse race gambling. This survey found almost no
previous research on cannibalization from sports betting in the existing literature.
Several recent papers in the economics literature analyzed cannibalization in other gambling
markets. Forrest et al. (2010) found evidence that lower prices on large jackpot lotteries, gener-
ated by large rollover jackpots, reduced bookmaker betting in the UK using data from a national
bookmaker from 1996 to 2001. Farrell and Forrest (2008) analyzed multiple instances of gambling
market cannibalization in Australia using annual state level data from 1982 to 2001. They reported
evidence that Electronic Gaming machines and an on-line Keno game cannibalized spending on high
jackpot lottery games. Forrest and Pe´rez (2011) analyzed the impact of expansion of lotteries on
sports betting in the form of football pools in Spain over a long period of time, 1970-2007. The
evidence suggests that the introduction of large jackpot lotteries in 1985 substantially cannibalized
football pool betting based on a difference-in-differences approach.
A few papers analyze data from individual casinos to determine the relationship between dif-
ferent sources of revenue in casinos from the perspective of casino management. Abarbanel et al.
(2011) analyzed the relationship between daily revenues generated by slot machines and dollars
wagered at the sports book at a single Las Vegas casino from January to September 2009. The
paper reported no statistical relationship between dollars wagered in the sports book and revenues
at slot machines. Suh and Tsai (2013) analyzed the relationship between daily slot machine rev-
enues and the number of people playing poker at two Las Vegas casinos in 2005 and 2006. The
paper reported no statistical relationship between the number of poker players and revenues at
slot machines. Lucas (2014) analyzed the relationship between daily revenues generated by slot
machines and dollars wagered at the sports book at three Las Vegas casinos from February to
August 2009. The paper reported no statistical relationship between dollars wagered in the sports
book and revenues at slot machines at two of the casinos. At the third casino, revenues generated
by slot machines increased when dollars wagered in the sports book increased. A 1% increase in
sports book wagering increased slot revenues by 0.04%.
All three of these papers analyzed the relationship between wagering at existing sports books
and VLT/slot machine revenues using standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models.
While the general findings in this literature suggest no relationship between economic activity at
sports books and VLT machines, none of these papers attempted to analyze a causal relationship
between these types of gambling. These papers could not exploit exogenous changes in sports
betting opportunities like those that occurred in West Virginia. They also did not address the tax
revenue implications of these different types of gambling.
States rushing to legalize sports betting after the SCOTUS decision on PASPA appear to have
put little thought into the potential impact of an expansion of legal sports betting on other existing
gambling revenues and taxes. Although little evidence based on sports betting exist, many studies
reported evidence that cannibalization often occurs among other forms of gambling. The presence
of cannibalization in other settings, along with the literature on cross-boarder effects of gambling
expansion (Walker and Jackson, 2008; Paton and Williams, 2013; Cummings et al., 2017) should
lead policy makers to think carefully before legalizing sports betting to increase gambling tax
revenues.
Sports betting in West Virginia underwent a number of unexpected events that make this
an interesting setting for research on sports betting-related cannibalization in gambling markets.
Legalization occurred early in West Virginia. The legislature legalized sports betting on 3 March
2018, more than two months before the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) overturned
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PASPA, allowing states outside Nevada to legalize and regulate sports betting. Like other forms
of gambling, the West Virginia Lottery Commission regulates sports betting in the state. West
Virginia taxes net sports betting revenues, defined as the total dollar value of sports betting tickets
written less winning tickets cashed and voids (primarily wagers that end in a push) at 10%.
The first sports book in the state, operated by William Hill, opened on 30 August 2018 at the
Hollywood Casino in Charles Town. The sports book at the Greenbrier Casino, operated by Fan
Duel, opened a week later. Both operated continuously until the governor closed all West Virginia
casinos in March 2020 due to the novel coronavirus. The other state casinos did not open sports
books until later in 2018. The sports book at Mountaineer Casino in the northern panhandle,
operated by William Hill, opened on 21 November. The sports books at the two casinos operated
by Delaware North, at the Wheeling Island and Mardi Gras casinos, opened on the same day, 27
December 2018. Miomni Gaming operated both these sports books and also operated a mobile app
that allowed for on-line betting by in-state registered users only.
Delaware North became involved in a dispute with Miomni Gaming over licensing in February
2019. Both of the Miomni operated sports books, and all associated mobile betting, ceased opera-
tion on 6 March 2019. The sports books at these two casinos did not reopen until early February
2020. Neither resumed taking bets from mobile devices. This closure and subsequent reopening of
two sports books represent unexpected shocks to the gambling market in West Virginia that should
be exogenous to other unobservable factors affecting this market.
Other casinos eventually offered mobile betting to state residents. Hollywood Casino partnered
with Draftkings in spring 2019 to offer mobile betting. On 22 May the WVLC issued a mobile
betting licence to Hollywood/Draftkings. WVLC suspended this license a week later, citing con-
cerns about the applicability of the Wire Act to mobile betting in the state. The Hollywood casino
did not begin taking mobile betting until early August 2019. The Greenbrier also began taking
bets from mobile devices at the same time. The Mountaineer casino sports book in the northern
panhandle does not take bets from mobile devices.
The uneven roll-out of sports betting in West Virginia represents an interesting setting for ana-
lyzing the impact of sports betting on other casino revenue sources. Sports betting at Mountaineer
casino, and at Hollywood and the Greenbrier for some periods, took place only at the casino, where
VLTs and table game wagering also takes place. Sports betting at Wheeling Island and Mardi
Gras occurred both at the sports book and through a mobile app for a period of time, shut down
unexpectedly, and resumed in the casino only more than an year later. These events represent
exogenous sources of variation in the opportunity to bet on sporting events in the state that can
be exploited in empirical analysis.
Empirical Analysis
Data
The data come from the West Virginia Lottery Corporation weekly reports on gambling in the
state. These reports contain data on gambling at each of the five casinos aggregated across weeks
ending on Saturday of each week. The data files contain information on total weekly revenues
from VLT and table game play at each casino, as well as the weekly dollar value of sports betting
tickets written at each sports book, when open. The data files also contain information on dollar
values won on all three types of gambling and other information. I analyze data beginning the
week of Saturday 1 September, the week when the sports book at the Hollywood Casino opened,
until the week of 7 March 2020 when all West Virginia casinos closed because of the novel corona
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virus outbreak. I set sports wagering revenues equal to zero in weeks when sports books were not
operating.
I augment these data with information about the number of games played in each week in the
National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball
(MLB), the National Hockey Association (NHL), and National Collegiate Athletic Association Foot-
ball Bowl Subdivision football (NCAA FB), sports long-identified as popular with North American
gamblers.1 Variation in the number of games played per week in these sports generates variation
in demand for wagers among gamblers, either because the more games played per week, the more
likely financially motivated gamblers find attractive games to bet on, or because more gamblers
with behavioral biases like sentiment bias observe games played by their favorite team to bet on.
This variation also reflects idiosyncratic factors associated with league schedules like bye weeks or
off days, travel time between games, facility availability, and other factors exogenous to unobserv-
able factors affecting gambling markets. These variables should be plausibly exogenous to other
unobservable factors.
Table 2 contains basic summary statistics for weekly sports betting-related variables. Observa-
tions represent values aggregated to the calendar week level ending on Saturday.
Sports book handle represents the total value of sports betting tickets written at each sports
book in each week. Sports book hold represents sports betting revenues (hold minus voids minus
winning tickets cashed) as a fraction of handle, a common measure of sports book profitability.
VLT and table game revenues represent the total amount of money bet on each gambling type. All
variables expressed in nominal terms, as the sample period consists of less than two calendar years
in a very low inflationary environment.
Table 2: Summary Statistics - Weekly Data
Mean Std Dev
Sports Book Handle 970155.9 976142.7
Sports Book Hold 0.10 0.19
VLT Revenues 21189437.9 17678928.1
Table Game Revenues 412857.9 428746.4
Mobile Device Betting Period 1 0.14 0.35
Mobile Device Betting Period 2 0.34 0.47
Wheeling/Mardi Gras Suspension 0.59 0.49
NFL Games 12.1 5.72
NBA Games 43.1 13.3
MLB Games 83.2 25.3
NHL Games 40.1 16.6
NCAA FB Games 42.1 27.3
Observations 395
The average sports book took in a bit less than a million dollars per week in handle. Sports
book hold averaged 10%, a relatively large amount. The hold at Nevada sports books averaged 5.75
percent in 2018. Weekly handle exhibits considerable variation over the sample period, primarily
because of the zeros in this variable. VLT revenues exceed sports book handle by a wide margin,
averaging almost 21 million dollars per week across all casinos in the state. Table game revenues
1NHL game data from www.hockey-reference.com, NFL from www.pro-football-reference.com, NBA from
www.basketball-reference.com, NCAA FB from www.sports-reference.com and MLB from www.retrosheet.org. Un-
fortunately, no easily downloadable data source for NCAA basketball games exists.
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average more than $400,000 per week. The 11 week period in 2019 when Wheeling and Mardi Gras
offered mobile sports betting, identified as Mobile Device Betting Period 1 accounts for 14% of the
weeks in the sample. The 2019-2020 period when Charles Town and the Greenbrier offered mobile
device betting, identified as Mobile Device Betting Period 2, accounts for 34% of the weeks in the
sample. The period when the Mardi Gras and Wheeling Casino sports book suspended operations
accounts for about 60% of the weeks in the sample.
The analysis of variation in sports book handle below uses variation in the number of games
played in the NFL, NBA, MLB, NHL, and National Collegiate Athletic Association Football Bowl
Subdivision football in each week to explain observed variation in sports book handle. Games
played in these leagues cover the entire calendar year. These variables exhibit substantial variation
over the sample period.
Table 3: Summary Statistics By Casino
Hollywood Greenbrier Mardi Gras Mountaineer Wheeling
Sports Book Weekly Handle 2,252,954.82 138,780.77 553,380.61 650,690.79 391,864.02
Sports Book Hold 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.15
VLT Revenues 53,226,385.07 1,599,829.07 11,029,139.74 18,983,139.88 21,108,695.88
Table Game Revenues 1,213,485.85 76,939.57 285,304.31 287,840.67 156,108.64
Table 3 shows summary statistics for key gambling revenue data by casino over the sample
period. Table 3 reveals substantial heterogeneity across the five casinos in West Virginia. Holly-
wood Casino in Charles Town, located in the far eastern panhandle near Washington DC, took in
substantially more gambling revenue per week than the other four casinos, more than $52 million
per week. In terms of VLT wagering, Hollywood Casino took in more than $53 million per week
over the sample period. For fiscal year 2018, which ran from July 2017 until June 2018, Hollywood
Casino took in a total of just over $2.9 billion in VLT revenues. The Greenbrier, located in the
relatively isolated south east of the state, takes in far less gambling revenue per week than the
other four casinos.
Determinants of Sports Betting Handle
Figure 2 shows the actual weekly sports betting handle at each casino. This figure underscores the
changes over time in sports betting throughout the sample period. The top grey line shows total
weekly handle at the Hollywood Casino in Charles Town, which operates a larger bookmaking
operation than the other four casinos. The bottom grey line shows total weekly handle at the
Greenbrier where the sports book opened in early September, two weeks after Hollywood. The
Greenbrier sports book handle is small. The middle grey line shows total weekly handle at the
sports book at Mountaineer Casino in the northern panhandle.
The two black lines show total weekly handle at the two casinos operated by Delaware North
(Mardi Gras in Kanawaha County and Wheeling Island in the northern panhandle). These two
sports books opened later than others in the states, and suspended operations on 6 March because
of a dispute with the company operating the sports books, Miomni Gaming. They only reopened
in February 2020, near the end of the sample. Both have relatively small handles.
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Figure 2: Sports Book Weekly Handle by Casino
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The clearly apparent spike in weekly handle at Hollywood, Mountaineer and the Greenbrier in
April comes from the week containing the first round games, and half the second round games, in
the NCAA Men’s College Basketball tournament, a famously popular event with sports bettors.
I first undertake an analysis of the determinants of sports book handle. Little research on handle
at individual sports books exists, due to a lack of data. Variation in the weekly handle at a sports
book reflects decisions made by bettors to wager on sporting events. Many factors can affect these
decisions, including the prices (point spreads and odds) offered by sports books, the attractiveness
of the slate of games played in each week, seasonal factors, the presence of games played between
popular teams, and other factors. I assume that the number of possible games available to bet on
represents one major factor affecting bettors decisions to place wagers and the size of the wagers
placed. To quantify this, I collected data on the number of games played each week in the four
major professional leagues (NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB) and NCAA FBS college football.
The regression model explaining observed variation in weekly sports book handle takes the form
Hiw = ϕi + β1Gjw + β2Cw + ηiw (1)
where Hiw reflects weekly in-facility handle at the sports book at casino i in week w. ϕi captures
time-invariant casino-specific effects that influence weekly handle. The vector Gjw reflects the total
number of games played in sport j in week w. j =(NFL, NBA, MLB, NHL, NCAAFB). The vector
Cw reflects specific events affecting the sports betting environment in the state in week w. These
11
events include the period after the Hollywood sports book opened and before the other four sports
books opened, the period after Mardi Gras and Wheeling suspended sports betting, the period
when mobile sports betting existed, and indicator variables for the first n weeks of operation at
each sports book (except Hollywood) to account for any start-up effects. The equation error term,
ηiw, captures all other unobservable factors affecting sports book handle over the sample period. I
assume this variable takes on the usual mean zero and possibly heteroscedastic characteristics and
adjust all estimated standard errors for heteroscedasticity.
Table 4 contains results for two alternative regression models: one omitting dummy variables for
the period when mobile betting was available, shown in the first column, and an alternative model
including a variables for the two periods of mobile device betting, shown in the second column.
Note one complication in identifying the impact of mobile betting comes from the fact that mobile
betting was offered during the same time period as in-facility betting at Mardi Gras and Wheeling
Island. Again, period 1 was when Mardi Gras and Wheeling Island offered mobile device betting
and period 2 when Hollywood and the Greenbrier offered mobile device betting.
Several interesting patters emerge from Table 4. In terms of the impact of games available to
bet on, handle varies systematically with the number of NFL and NBA games played in each week.
Evidence clearly indicates that bettors strongly prefer to bet on NFL games. It appears that West
Virginia bettors also prefer wagering on NBA games. NCAA football games do not appear to affect
handle.
Table 4 also shows evidence of a start-up effect in sports betting. The large negative estimated
parameter on the indicator variable for the first week a sports book opened reflects the fact that
several of the sports books opened on a Friday or Saturday, generating only one or two days of
wagering in that week. Week two and three also show negative effects for full weeks of betting.
This suggests that bettors take some time to learn that a sports book opened and to decide to
travel to the book and place wagers. The parameter estimates on weeks following week 3 are not
statistically different from zero; by week three, the sports books reached their average handle over
the sample period.
The presence of mobile betting increased the in-facility handle at sports books across the state.
Only Mardi Gras and Wheeling Island offered mobile betting in period 1, and these two casinos
operated a sports book at the same time. Hollywood and the Greenbrier offered mobile device
betting in period 2. The estimated parameters on the mobile betting indicator variables suggests
that the availability of mobile betting is a complementary activity to in-facility sports betting in
both periods. Mobile device betting does not cannibalize in-facility betting at sports books.
The handle variable used in Table 4 takes a value of zero in weeks when no sports book operated
at a casino. This generates a balanced panel over the sample period. This implicitly assumes that
no bettors would have come to the casinos to be on sports during the sample period. This could
be an inappropriate assumption. Table 6 in the appendix contains results that omit observations
for weeks when no sports book operated at a casino. This reduces the sample size from 190 to 122.
The results on Table 6 resemble those on Table 4, with the caveat that the start-up effect lasts
until week five of operation on Table 6. The results appear robust to the method for quantifying
weeks with no sports betting at a casino.
Impact of Sports Betting on Other Casino Revenues
The literature contains a large number of papers documenting a displacement effect in consumer
spending on gambling. Most of these papers use data aggregated to the state, county, or postal
code data; few use data from individual casinos. The legalization of sports betting represents an
interesting setting for analyzing displacement effects. With the exception of the mobile sports
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Table 4: Regression Results - Weekly Sports Book Handle
NFL Games in week 6460.9 8150.8∗
(1.83) (2.45)
NBA Games in week 3281.8∗ 2865.5∗
(2.53) (2.23)
MLB Games in week -1596.3∗ -57.1
(-2.01) (-0.063)
NHL Games in week -346.3 1109.2
(-0.20) (0.63)
NCAA FB Games in week 1968.4 1701.3
(1.92) (1.69)
Pre Mountaineer Open -759722.5∗∗∗ -602795.9∗∗∗
(-10.1) (-7.40)
Pre Wheeling Open -252326.3∗∗∗ -75173.0
(-3.64) (-0.97)
Pre Mardi Gras Open -294008.0∗∗∗ -116854.7
(-3.79) (-1.43)
Week 1 Open -305155.8∗ -317182.8∗∗∗
(-1.99) (-3.60)
Week 2 Open -222735.0 -215737.5
(-0.81) (-0.93)
Week 3 Open -30140.5 -25479.1
(-0.14) (-0.15)
Week 4 Open 35237.3 39288.6
(0.17) (0.25)
Wheeling/Mardi Gras Suspension -299.5 77684.7
(-0.0058) (1.53)
Mobile Device Betting Period 1 320289.7∗∗∗
(4.62)
Mobile Device Betting Period 2 124413.5∗∗
(2.64)
Observations 395 395
R2 0.881 0.889
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗ ∗ ∗ :< 1 %.
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betting offered by Mardi Gras and Wheeling Island Casinos, all the sports betting in West Virginia
in the sample occurred in the sports books. These sports books operate in the casinos in close
proximity to existing table games and VLTs.
The impact of newly legalized sports betting on other in-casino revenues cannot be determined
a priori. Bettors wagering in the sports books who never visited a casino to play table games or
VLTs would have the opportunity to do so. If they also played a VLT or a few hands of blackjack,
then the presence of sports betting would increase other forms of in-casino gambling revenues.
On the other hand, the addition of a sports book could be attractive to existing patrons of the
casino who previously played table games or VLTs. In this case, the addition of a sports book would
decrease other forms of in-casino gambling revenue. The literature calls this the displacement effect.
Econometric analysis of the relationship between weekly sports book handle, table game revenues,
and VLT revenues can shed light on the importance of displacement in this setting.
Estimating the relationship between sports book handle and the other two forms of in-casino
revenue faces an important econometric issue. Unobservable factors that affect both consumer
wagering on sporting events and consumer wagering on table games and VLTs in casinos clearly
exist. Failure to account for these unobservable factors makes it impossible to uncover the causal
impact of consumer wagering on sporting events on table game and VLT wagering. Understanding
this relationship requires a modern causal inference method.
I use the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to estimate the causal impact of legalized sports
betting on table game and VLT wagering. IV estimation requires an exclusion restriction, in the
form of one or more variables that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, in this
case weekly sports betting handle, and uncorrelated with unobservable factors affecting wagering on
table games and VLTs. The analysis of the determinants of sports betting handle above identifies
two possible instruments: the number of NFL and NBA games scheduled each week. From Table
4, the more NFL and NBA games played in a week the larger the sports book handle in that week.
The number of NFL and NBA games played in a week should be plausibly exogenous to un-
observed factors affecting wagering on table games and VLTs in West Virginia casinos. The state
contains no NFL or NBA teams. Variation in the number of games play each week depends on the
details of the league schedules which are set months before casino customers decide to travel to a
casino and gamble. And the individual decisions made by bettors at table games or VLTs should
not depend in any way on the number of NHL or NBA games scheduled in that week.
The IV regression approach takes the usual form. Estimates from a first stage regression with
weekly sports book handle as the dependent variable and the instruments, and other exogenous
second stage variables, as explanatory variables are used to estimate a fitted value for weekly sports
book handle that should be, by construction, exogenous to factors in the equation error term in the
second stage. A second stage regression model, with either weekly table game revenues or weekly
VLT revenues as a dependent variable and the fitted value from the first stage along with other
explanatory variables provides an estimate of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of sports
book handle on the other two types of casino revenues.
Table 5 contains the second stage results from the IV estimation. Column (1) uses weekly table
game revenues as the dependent variable and Column (2) uses weekly VLT revenues. Both models
also contain casino fixed effects. The results suggest that no start-up effects exist, as expected.
The start of sports betting would not likely affect table games or VLT revenues immediately. The
suspension of sports betting and mobile sports betting at Mardi Gras and Wheeling island had
no effect on table game revenues but increased VLT revenues by more than $600,000 per week.
This suspension should be exogenous to unobservable factors affecting VLT wagering, since the
suspension of sports betting at these casinos resulted from a licensing dispute, not from any specific
activity in the betting market. The sports books and mobile app had been operating for many
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Table 5: IV Regression Results - Weekly Table Game and VLT Revenues
(1) (2)
Table Game Revenues VLT Revenues
Sports Book Handle 0.0147 -3.962∗
(0.0797) (1.982)
Week 1 Open 52592.4∗∗∗ 1141823.2
(15931.0) (685048.1)
Week 2 Open 41698.0 2017369.0
(74945.7) (1536523.6)
Week 3 Open 6605.4 -1864739.5
(17278.7) (952545.9)
Week 4 Open 17482.7 -1567059.8
(19537.2) (819809.1)
Wheeling/Mardi Gras Suspension -8688.7 643973.4∗
(17607.0) (260272.7)
Mobile Device Betting Period 1 -5358.0 1640457.6
(31553.7) (888481.0)
Mobile Device Betting Period 2 21581.2 622123.8
(34942.7) (621961.7)
N 394 395
Underidentification (Kleibergen LM) 26.62 26.55
Weak identification (Stock-Yogo) 15.13 15.09
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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weeks and there was little indication in the press that a dispute was brewing between Delaware
North and Miomni Gaming. The suspension occurred abruptly, and lasted for nearly a year. The
parameter on the suspension variable can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimate of
the causal effect of elimination of sports betting on VLT wagering. The positive and significant
sign on this variable suggests that sports bettors switched over to VLT wagering when the sports
books suspended operations.
The other parameter of interest is on the fitted value from the first stage regression for weekly
sports book handle. This parameter captures the LATE causal effect of increased sports betting on
other casino revenues. The parameter for the table game revenue model is not statistically different
from zero. However, the parameter for the VLT revenue model is negative and statistically different
from zero at the 5% significance level. Legalizing sports betting caused a reduction in VLT revenues
in West Virginia. The size of the parameter is economically significant as well. Each additional
$1 wagered on sports caused a $3.96 reduction in VLT wagering. This represents an elasticity
of VLT revenue with respect to changes in sports book handle of 0.18 at the mean of the sports
book handle and VLT revenue distributions. Note this parameter estimate is consistent with the
estimated positive effect of sports book shutdowns on VLT revenue at Mardi Gras and Wheeling
Island discussed above.
Table 7 in the appendix contains OLS results for the IV model using VLT revenue as the
dependent variable for comparison to the IV results. OLS does not correct for correlation between
sports betting handle and unobservable factors affecting table game and VLT revenues and OLS is
biased and inconsistent in the presence of such correlation. The OLS results indicate no association
between sports betting handle and these two variables. The parameter estimate on the sports book
handle variable in the OLS model is biased up because the model does not account for the impact
of game availability on handle.
Table 5 also shows two standard IV diagnostic statistics for instrument relevance, the Kleibergen-
Paap rk statistic and the Stock-Yogo first stage F statistic. The Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic rep-
resents a rank test. In this setting, identification requires that the rank condition is met. This
tests the extent to which the excluded variables in the first stage, the instruments, are correlated
with the endogenous dependent variable, sports book handle. A large rk statistic like this one (the
p-value for the null of uncorrelated instruments is smaller than 0.001) suggests the instruments are
valid. The Stock-Yogo first stage F statistic of 15 also suggests that the instruments are not weak.
The size of the estimated parameter on sports book handle appears plausible in economic
terms. Opening a sports book provides new wagering opportunities in casinos. The negative and
statistically significant parameter on the sports betting handle variable suggests that existing casino
customers change their behavior in response to the addition of a sports book to a casino, spending
less time and money gambling at VLTs and more time in the sports book. The size of the impact
represents an outcome where gamblers who previously spend an evening putting $40 into VLTs at
a casino instead spends some time putting $20 into VLTs and also spends time in the sports book
and put down a $5 bet on a game.
The reduction in VLT revenue caused by the legalization of sports betting implies substantial
fiscal consequences for the state. West Virginia taxes net sports book revenues at 10% and net
VLT revenue at race tracks at 53.5%. Taxes on gambling revenues at the Greenbrier casino are
more complicated because it has no race track and these calculations do not include revenues from
the Greenbrier. Total FY 2019 and 2020 sports book handle at the four casinos with race tracks
over the period 1 September 2018 through 7 March 2020, the period with legalized sports betting,
amounted to $44 million; total sports book tax revenues amounted to $2.6 million over that period.
Total VLT revenue at the four West Virginia casinos with race tracks totaled $8.8 billion over
the period 1 September 2018 through 7 March 2020. The results on Table 5 indicate that each
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additional dollar wagered on sporting events caused a $3.96 reduction in wagering on VLTs. Had
sports betting not been legalized, the IV results predict that VLT revenue would have been $949
million higher, an increase of about 11%. Assuming that the ratio of net VLT revenues to total
VLT revenues for this additional VLT wagering equals the ratio for existing net and total VLT
revenues, this increase in VLT revenues would have generated an additional $45.4 million in tax
revenues from the additional VLT wagering that would have taken place absent legalized sports
betting. This calculation applies the parameter estimate Table 5 for sports book handle to actual
VLT revenues earned in the four race track casinos in weeks when in-facility sports betting took
place in each casino.
In other words, the State of West Virginia gained $2.6 million in new tax revenues from legalized
sports betting, but gave up $45.4 million in forgone VLT tax revenues to get this increase. The
total impact of legalized sports betting was a loss of about $42 million in overall gambling-derived
tax revenues.
Conclusions
Many states rushed to legalize sports betting following the May 2018 SCOTUS decision overturning
PASPA that removed restrictions on sports betting and many more plan to legalize sports betting
in the near future. The lure of increased tax revenues from sports betting motivated these policy
changes. The overall fiscal impact of legalizing sports betting depends on the relationship between
consumer spending in sports books and consumer spending on other types of gambling available in
casinos. Legalizing sports betting will generate new tax revenues only if spending on other types
of gambling remain unchanged, or increase following legalization.
This paper exploits the legalization of sports betting in West Virginia, different opening dates
for sports books in the state, and an unexpected suspension of sports betting at two casinos
to investigate the impact of newly legalized sports betting on revenues from table games and
VLTs in casinos using an IV and difference-in-differences approach. The evidence paper develops
evidence consistent with important substitution between consumer spending on sports betting and
spending on VLTs in casinos, called “cannibalization” in the gambling literature. The results
imply substantial fiscal implications: legalized sports betting generated about $2.6 million in new
tax revenues from September 2018 to March 2020, but consumer substitution into sports betting
and away from VLT wagering caused a reduction in tax revenues generated by VLTs by about $45
million over the same period. Legalization of sports betting carried a substantial opportunity cost
in the form of forgone VLT tax revenues in West Virginia.
These results should give state policy makers considering legalization of sports betting pause.
While new revenue streams from legalized sports betting appear attractive on the surface, states
already generate substantial tax revenues from gambling, and the introduction of sports betting
to this mix does not leave spending on other forms of gambling untouched. States may implic-
itly assume that the introduction of sports betting will induce people who formerly placed bets
on sporting events in Nevada, where sports betting has been legal for decades, or illegally with
clandestine local bookmakers or online with offshore bookmakers to instead patronize local casinos
with sports books. This likely occurs, but the legalization of sports betting also induces existing
casino customers to change their spending patterns.
These results should also lead state policy makers to re-examine tax policy on all types of
gambling. West Virginia taxes net VLT revenues at 53.5% and new sports book revenues at 10%.
This differential magnified the overall fiscal effect of the change in gambler’s spending patterns
generated by legalization. Changing the mix of tax rates applied to different types of gambling
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could mitigate the fiscal consequences of legalization.
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Appendix
The results in Table 4 set sports book handle equal to zero in weeks when no sports book was
operating at a given casino. This creates a balanced panel over the sample period. However, this
approach assumes that no sports betting represents a consumer choice, while those zeros actually
represent no opportunity for bettors to wager at that casino. The results on Table 6 set these
values to missing, reducing the sample size.
Table 6: Regression Results - Total Handle with Unbalanced Panel
NFL Games in week 18777.0∗∗∗ 19618.1∗∗∗
(3.35) (3.71)
NBA Games in week 5793.7∗∗ 5567.0∗∗
(3.29) (3.31)
MLB Games in week -426.3 1417.0
(-0.40) (1.16)
NHL Games in week 93.5 1506.9
(0.044) (0.69)
NCAA FB Games in week 3118.0 2225.6
(1.76) (1.28)
Week 1 Open -754927.6∗∗∗ -657684.0∗∗∗
(-7.44) (-7.21)
Week 2 Open -559842.0∗∗ -479693.6∗∗
(-3.29) (-2.80)
Week 3 Open -330315.3∗ -262835.3
(-2.14) (-1.92)
Week 4 Open -252845.5 -186361.8
(-1.68) (-1.40)
Week 5 Open -197346.9 -109882.7
(-1.38) (-0.79)
Week 6 Open -7419.5 56383.1
(-0.062) (0.49)
Mobile Device Betting Period 1 199890.3∗∗
(2.84)
Mobile Device Betting Period 2 214709.1∗∗∗
(3.38)
Observations 255 255
R2 0.885 0.891
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗ ∗ ∗ :< 1 %.
Table 5 shows evidence from an IV regression that corrects for possible endogeneity of the vari-
able reflecting total weekly sports book handle in a regression model explaining observed variation
in weekly table game and VLT revenues. Table 7 shows OLS results for this regression model. The
OLS results show no assoication between sports book handle and either table game revenues or
VLT revenues.
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Table 7: Regression Results - OLS Estimates for VLT IV Model
Sports Book Handle 0.084
(0.12)
Week 1 Open 1600194.1∗∗
(2.65)
Week 2 Open 2341568.9
(1.28)
Week 3 Open -2187162.7∗
(-2.01)
Week 4 Open -2105452.2∗
(-2.36)
Wheeling/Mardi Gras Suspension 599741.7∗
(2.40)
Mobile Device Betting Period 1 113220.6
(0.16)
Mobile Device Betting Period 2 -644638.6∗∗
(-2.64)
Observations 395
R2 0.975
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗ ∗ ∗ :< 1 %.
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Figure 3: Average Weekly Table Game Revenue by Casino
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Figure 4: Average Weekly VLT Revenue by Casino
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